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Physical and Managed Risk of Nuclear Waste*
Lennart Sjdberg & Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjiberg**
Introduction
Risks are usually implicitly construed as the net outcome of physical
and social processes. For example, the risk associated with nuclear waste
is the outcome of physical processes in the radioactive waste material
and all the measures taken to protect the environment from the emitted
radiation. Hence, both physical and social aspects enter the picture, and
the final overall risk assessment must be taken into account. How risk
judgments may differ with respect to physical and social dimensions of
the issue, however, is seldom discussed.
Trust in those responsible for managing a risk is often an important
factor in risk perception. 1 It is reasonable to believe that trust is
primarily important with respect to social risk dimensions. Yet, it may
also enter into the assessment of physical dimensions, since belief in the
accuracy of risk estimates has an element of trust in expert credibility.
Nuclear waste disposal ia highly controversial in most countries,
including Sweden. Earlier statements to the effect that the issue has
been "solved" in Sweden 2 were based on single-question polling data,
in which 58% of the public sampled said they "accepted" a local
repository of high level nuclear waste. Several other studies,3 sampling
* This work was supported by the Swedish Board for Spent Nuclear Fuel, the
Swedish Inst. of Radiation Protection and the European Union.
** Lennart Sj6berg is Professor of Psychology and Head, Center for Risk Research
(CRR) of the Stockholm School of Economics. Email: pls@hhs.se. Britt-Marie
Drottz-Sj6berg is Associate Professor, Behavioral Risk Research, at the CRR and
Professor of Social Psychology at the Norwegian University of Science & Technology,
Trondheim.
1 Lennart Sj6berg, Perceived Competence and Motivation in Industry and
Government as Factors in Risk Perception, presented Bellingham Int'l Conf., Social
Trust in Risk Management, Western University of Washington, July 1996.
2 James Flynn et al, Time to Rethink Nuclear Waste Storage, 8 Issues Sci. &
Tech. 42 (1992); James FLynn et al., One Hundred Centuries of Solitude:
Redirecting America's High-Level Nuclear Waste Policy (1995).
3 Lennart Sjbberg & Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjibberg, Risk Perception of Nuclear
Waste: Experts and the Public (CRR 1994).
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broader populations and allowing for anonymous responses, however
gave much lower percentages of "acceptance."
In addition, the first local referendum on nuclear waste disposal in
Sweden, in September 1995, resulted in a large majority rejecting
further surveying for a local repository site. It was conducted in
Storuman, a sparsely populated northern community of about 7,000. A
brief discussion of the referendum, the most recent major political
event concerning nuclear waste in Sweden, is therefore warranted.
In October 1992, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste
Management Company (SKB) informed all Swedish communities of
the development of a program for the disposal of high level radioactive
materials. Storuman was one of the few communities to respond to
SKB's proposal for a preliminary study to determine the feasibility of
locating a repository in the area.
An invitation to SKB to conduct a preliminary study quickly
resulted in opposition and the formation of a "no to nuclear waste in
Storuman" group. People in favor of inviting SKB or who believed that
the idea at least should be investigated responded by forming another
group. The pro-invitation group focused on the economic possibilities
of community development and particularly organized local business
interests. The local government continuously kept the public informed
about developments by organizing a "reference group," and inviting
local political parties as well as all active interest groups. In early 1995, it
decided to hold a local referendum the following September. The
question presented was whether SKB should be allowed to continue the
search for a final repository location in Storuman. The outcome was an
overwhelming "no" (70.5%).
Following the referendum, Drottz-Sj6berg conducted in-depth
interviews with both proponents and opponents.4 She found that trust
in the risk management process was not the most crucial issue. Rather, a
host of social, health related, economic and political issues that had
arisen from intense discussions in the community over a period of
several years prior to the referendum, were found more important. The
main results of the interviews were summarized in several value
dimensions, including a main dimension of individualism (personal
4 Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjbberg, Stnningar i Storuman efter folkomr6stningen om
ett djupfdrvar (SKB 1996).
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success) vs. collectivism (solidarity). Further, repository opponents
often relied on values or explanations emphasizing tradition, small-scale
establishments, personal control, the need for high level security, risk
for future generations, and the importance of preserving nature and
keeping the wilderness intact.
In contrast, those in favor of permitting SKB to continue its search
in the area emphasized the importance of increased investment and its
spin-off effects, the need to sustain current and future employment
levels, possible influence on local development, and the need for
economic and social change.
The conclusions drawn from the overall referendum process in
Storuman agreed with the different attitudes revealed, e.g., optimism
demonstrated by the display of strong public involvement by repository
opponents to the prospecting, and pessimism regarding future
development among proponents. The entire process was democratic,
shifting from representative principles to direct public participation.
The nuclear waste issue had already become very important in
Swedish politics fifteen to twenty years ago. Despite agreement among
Swedish experts that the issue has been resolved, the public has not yet
accepted the premise that a safe method for storing nuclear waste
exists. 5 Differences between expert and public perceptions of nuclear
waste risk are tremendous. Current tensions are well documented in a
symposium report dealing with the role of environmental impact
assessment in connection with final waste disposal.6
Sweden, however, has had some success in dealing with low and
medium level nuclear waste. Comparatively speaking, there may be less
intense social and political conflicts over nuclear waste in Sweden than
many other countries. Confidence in government authorities and
experts may be at a higher level.
Previous work on the perceived risk of nuclear waste has involved
extensive mapping of the risk perception of the public, nuclear and
environmental experts, and local politicians specializing in
environmental matters. 7 In this paper, we further develop the
5 Sj6berg & Drottz-Sjdberg, supra note 3.
6 Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste, KASAM, Nuclear Waste and the
Environment (1995).
7 Lennart Sj6berg & Britt-Marie Drottz-Sj6berg, Attitudes toward Nuclear Waste
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distinction between the perceived physical and managed risks of nuclear
waste. Physical risk is construed as the time during which nuclear waste
is perceived as dangerous, whereas managed risk is measured by a
judgment of how deep such waste must be buried in bedrock. Three
levels of waste are studied and comparisons between the perceptions of
the public, politicians and nuclear experts are made.
It was originally hypothesized that the public would demand a
deeper repository than either the experts or politicians. The latter two
groups are assumed to be more trustful of the risk management process.
No hypothesis was formulated about beliefs concerning the physical
risk, which is reflected in time ratings.
Method
We report results from five data sets. The numbers of respondents
and response rates are given in Table 1.
Table 1
Characteristics of Used Data Sets
Set No. of respondents Response rate (%)
Public, 1987 590 48
Public, 1992-93 1179 65
Public, 1995 541 53
Experts, 1992-93 138 69
Politicians, 1995 330 63
The questionnaires asked for the judgment of the time during
which the waste remains dangerous, and the desired depth of a bedrock
repository. These judgments were to be made for three levels of waste:
low; medium; and high.
The three levels were explained in the questionaires as follows:
Radioactive waste from nuclear power plants can, from the
standpoint of handling, be categorized in three main groups:
(a) low level waste, e.g., protective clothing; (b) middle level
waste, e.g., filter material and certain demolition material,
and (c) high level waste, consisting mostly of used nuclear
fuel.
(CRR 1993); Lennart Sjbberg & Britt-Marie Drottz-Sj-berg, supra note 2 and
Lennart Sj6berg, Risk Perceptions by Politicians and the Public (CRR 1996).
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Respondents were asked to rate the time in years during which they
believed that the three levels of waste could possibly injure people and,
given that storing in bedrock was the method used, at what depth (in
meters) would storage be appropriate.
Results
All analyses reported below were performed on log ratings of time
and depth. As a preliminary analysis, time and depth ratings were
correlated with each other, and the correlations were factor analyzed.
Two factors accounted for 83% of the total variance. The rotated
factor loadings (varimax) are shown below. As seen, depth and time
ratings were clearly distinguished, with only a slight overlap.
Table 2
Factor Loadings for Time and Depth Ratings.
Factor 1 Factor 2
Time, low level 0.26 0.82
Time, medium level 0.17 0.95
Time, high level -0.02 0.84
Depth, low level 0.91 0.16
Depth, medium level 0.97 0.14
Depth, high level 0.87 0.08
Table 3 8
Correlations Between Log Ratings of Time and Depth, A Pooled Index of Perceived
Nuclear Waste Risk and an Index of Trust in Nuclear Waste Experts
Nuclear waste risk Trust in
management experts
Time, low level 0.094* -0.092*
Time, medium level 0.022 -0.095*
Time, high level -0.073 -0.042
Depth, low level 0.201*** -0.136**
Depth, medium level 0.206*** -0.146**
Depth, high level 0.186*** -0.162***
In data obtained from politicians and the public, a pooled index of
perceived nuclear waste risk was correlated with time and depth ratings.
As expected, the strongest correlation was observed between the overall
8 *** p<0.001,** p<0.01,*p<0.05
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perceived risk of nuclear waste and depth ratings. In contrast, perceived
risk correlated poorly with time ratings.
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A pooled index of trust in waste risk management was correlated
with time and depth ratings, as shown in Table 3. It is clear from these
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results that the depth ratings were most consistently related to trust,
whereas time ratings were virtually independent of trust.
Because of the skewed distributions, geometric means were
computed for all three levels of waste. See the figures above.
It is seen that:
* Compared to the public, experts gave longer time
estimates, especially regarding high level waste, and
estimated a lesser desired repository depth.
* Although the differences between politicians and the
public were smaller, the same trend in disagreement as
that seen between experts and the public was observed.
Some differences were very striking. Note, for example, that
experts estimated high level waste to be dangerous for about 20,000
years whereas estimates given by the public and politicians were only
2,000 and 500 years, respectively. Differences among the estimates
given by the different groups were much smaller for the depth required
for a repository. Due to the large sample sizes, all of the measured
group differences were statistically significant. It is also noteworthy that
there was closer agreement between the public and politicians than
between the public and experts.
Discussion
Time and depth ratings differed when it came to their relationships
with other variables. Time and depth ratings correlated weakly, and
time ratings were virtually independent of the trust and general hazard
ratings for nuclear waste. These findings support the suggestion that
time ratings reflect perceptions about physical rather than managed
risk, and that managed risk has broader implications and relationships
to other types of data than physical risk. Further study of the concepts
.of physical and inherent risk is called for.
Both experts and politicians gave less extreme ratings of depth than
the public, indicating more trust in the risk management process. Yet
they exhibited more knowledge of associated physical dangers -
especially those of high level waste - and gave more extreme time
ratings than members of the public. It should be noted that the
politicians were closer to the public than they were to the experts.
It is noted that the more dangerous waste should be placed at a
greater depth, although a small minority believed that high level waste
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should be stored closer to the surface, 9 presumably to allow more
effective monitoring and control.
Other data have shown that experts in particular were much more
likely to trust the risk management of nuclear waste. 10 Politicians, on
the other hand, responded more like the public, although not quite as
distrustful. 11 The results of the present study are quite consistent with
these general trends.
The present Swedish plans call for burial of high level nuclear waste
in bedrock at a depth of about 500 meters. The fact that people require
a greater depth, despite being unaware of the very long time ranges
involved, is an interesting observation. It is possible that times beyond
several hundred years are discounted by a majority of the public,
despite the existence of groups having a significantly different set of
beliefs and values. 12 Aspects other than the long term perspective, as
illustrated by the previously discussed Storuman referendum, can
therefore account for opposition to a nuclear waste repository.
9 Sjbberg & Drottz-Sj6berg, supra note 8.
10 Sjdberg & Drottz-Sj6berg, supra note 3.
11 Sj~berg, supra note 8.
12 Ola Svenson & Gunnar Karlsson, Decision-Making, Time Horizons, and Risk in
the Very Long-Term Perspective, 9 RiskAnal. 385 (1989).
